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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR
POOR RELIEF IN MISSOURI
The Constitution of Missouri, article IV, section 46 provides:
The General Assembly shall have no power to make any
grant, or to authorize the making of any grant of public
money or thing of value to any individual, association of
individuals, municipal or other corporation whatsoever:
Provided, That this shall not be so construed as to prevent
the grant of aid in case of a public calamity.
During the 1939 session of the General Assembly, when an ap-
propriation of state funds for direct grants to the indigent was
discussed, the opinion was expressed that it would be uncon-
stitutional under this section.' To indicate that the enacted bill
was designed to come within the proviso, the statute restricted
the use of the funds to "aid or relief in case of a public calam-
ity."' 2 If the present economic situation be found to be a public
calamity, one difficulty will be obviated. There may be serious
question, however, as to whether the present economic situation
is a public calamity and whether the funds can now be used. If
the section as a whole be found not to apply, it is believed that
an appropriation for outdoor3 poor relief will be constitutional
in any event. The scope of this inquiry, therefore, will be to
consider the constitutionality of an outdoor poor relief appropri-
ation not restricted in terms to use in case of a public calamity.
The problem of public care and maintenance of the indigent
is one not new to Anglo-American law, for it arose in England
with the breakup of feudalism and the dissolution of the monas-
teries.4 Responsibility for its solution was soon assumed by the
state; and in 1601 parishes were given the power to tax for the
support of the poor and to establish a system of work for the
able-bodied, almshouses for the infirm, and apprenticeship for
children. In the United States during the colonial period, relief
was given the poor in their own homes; but later the institutional
system was established in some states around the county poor
farm, in others around state institutions. In Missouri from the
advent of government under the present Constitution, the duty
1. Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 13, 1939.
2. Mo. Laws of 1939, 97.
3. I. e., relief not administered in state institutions.
4. Pipkin, "Poor Laws," 12 Ency. of Social Sciences (1934) 230.
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of supporting the poor has been delegated to the county govern-
ments.5 This method, however, has in Missouri and in some
other states, broken down under the strain of the unemployment
situation of the past decade, and state governments have found
themselves constrained to appropriate funds principally to care
for those who either because of physical disabilities or other
reasons were unable to qualify for federal work relief assistance.0
In so doing legislators have found themselves faced in many
states with constitutional restrictions on the use of public funds
and with limitations on the state's authority to incur debts. In
some states amendments to these sections have been passed,
narrowing their scope and expressly authorizing relief of the
indigent.7 In others appropriations have been made in the belief
that they were not within the scope of restrictions.
To answer the question of whether they come within these
restrictions, it will be well to consider first the history and
purpose of the restrictions. They have roots in the period from
1840o1890,8 in the advent of the railroads and the increase of
business enterprises. The great railroads found in this period
such a problem of financing their operations that they were
forced to turn to the state and local governments for working
capital. Promises of large dividends and competition among
towns for railroad facilities so influenced public opinion that
state legislatures were forced to authorize towns to lend their
credit heavily in aid of railroad and other enterprises., "Govern-
ment aid to railroads" was the cry of the day, and state and
town were soon showering these private companies with sub-
scriptions to stock, outright gifts of land and money, and gifts
of state and municipal bonds. 1 Towns later found that dividends
were scarce, that expected economic advantages were slow to
bear fruit, and that their unwise policy was leading them to-
ward bankruptcy.2 1 Many states and municipalities facing bank-
ruptcy or repudiation of their bonds did repudiate and projected
5. R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 961, 12950.
6. See Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Liveright (1932) 308 Pa. 35,
161 Atl. 697, 714.
7. Fla. Const. art XIII, sec. 3; Okla. Const. art XXV; Tex. Const. art.
III, sec. 51A.
8. McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation (1930) 18 Cal. L. Rev. 137,
140.
9. Dodd, State Government (1922) 98.
10. McAllister, supra note 8, at 140.
11. By 1846 the state of New York found it had contracted debts which
with interest amounted to $38,000,000, $6,000,000 of which had gone to
finance insolvent railroads. See People v. The Westchester County Nat'l
Bank (1921) 231 N. Y. 465, 132 N. E. 241, 243, 15 A. L. R. 1344.
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the legal issue into the courts. It was out of this welter of bicker-
ing between town, railroad, and subsequent purchasers of bonds
that the courts evolved the doctrine of public purpose as limiting
the legality of governmental expenditures.
Prior to this time public funds had been spent without any
judicial scrutiny of purpose. 2 In 1849 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania expressed the prevailing view: "From the com-
mencement of the government, our representative bodies have
exerted the unchallenged power to levy taxes * * * for every pur-
pose deemed by them legitimate." 3 But the later development
was not unheralded. In a case decided in 1837 involving the
power of a town to divide a surplus "according to families," the
Maine court had said:
No public exigency can require, that one citizen should
place his estates in the public treasury for no purpose, but
to be distributed to those, who have not contributed to ac-
cumulate them, and who are not dependent upon public
charity.
And again:
Such a construction would be destructive of the security
and safety of individual property; and subversive of indi-
vidual industry and exertion. It would authorize a violation
of what is asserted in our "declaration of rights" to be one
of the natural rights of men, that of "acquiring, possessing
and protecting property."'1
Thereafter the doctrine of public purpose lay dormant until
the first case questioning the validity of grants to railroads
reached the courts in 1853. This was Sharpless v. Mayor of
Philadelphia,5 a suit to enjoin subscriptions by the city of Phila-
delphia to the stock of two railroads. The injunction was denied
on the usual ground that no constitutional provision was violated,
but Chief Justice Black went on to enunciate the public purpose
doctrine8 which was soon to take hold throughout the courts:
12. McAllister, supra note 8, at 140.
13. Commonwealth v. M'Williams (1849) 11 Pa. 61, 71.
14. Hooper v. Emery (1837) 14 Me. 375, 380. The money had been de-
posited with the town by the state of Maine to be used for the same purpose
for which it had the power to tax. As the statute granting the town power
to tax limited that right to certain enumerated purposes, the court held the
the town could not distribute the money. But immediately thereafter the
state passed a statute (1837, c. 265) authorizing the towns to distribute the
money per capita and the towns presumably did so without challenge in the
courts. The above quoted alternative ground for decision seems to have been
ignored by the legislature.
15. (1853) 21 Pa. 147.
16. Id. at 168.
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Neither has the legislature any constitutional right to
create a public debt, or to lay a tax, or to authorize any
municipal corporation to do it, in order to raise funds for a
mere private purpose. No such authority passed to the
Assembly by the general grant of legislative power. This
would not be legislation. Taxation is a mode of raising
revenue for public purposes. When it is prostituted to ob-
jects in no way connected with the public interest or wel-
fare, it ceases to be taxation, and becomes plunder.
Justice Black, however, held that aid to railroads was a public
purpose. This view was accepted by the vast majority of courts,
many of them reasoning that railroads had a public aspect de-
rived from the fact that they had been given the power of
eminent domain.17 Justice Black's dictum was seized upon by the
courts and in the next two decades made the basis of several
decisions.,8 By the decision in 1874 of Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 9
which held invalid as for a private purpose a municipal bond
granted to aid a private industry, the Supreme Court of the
United States, established the doctrine
that there can be no lawful tax which is not laid for a
public purpose.
* * * And in deciding whether, in the given case, the ob-
ject for which the taxes are assessed falls upon the one side
or the other of this line, they must be governed mainly by
the course and usage of government, the objects for which
taxes have been customarily and by long course of legisla-
tion levied, what objects or purposes have been considered
necessary to the support and for the proper use of the gov-
ernment, whether State or municipal. Whatever lawfully
pertains to this and is sanctioned by time and the acquies-
cence of the people may well be held to belong to the public
use, and proper for the maintenance of good government,
though this may not be the only criterion of rightful taxa-
tion.20
17. Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) sec. 313. Contra:
Hanson v. Vernon (1869) 27 Iowa 28; People v. Salem (1870) 20 Mich.
452; Whiting v. The Sheboygan and Fond du Lac R. R. (1870) 25 Wis. 167,
3 Am. Rep. 30.
18. Allen v. Jay (1872) 60 Me. 124 (statute authorizing town to lend
money to manufacturer to locate a factory in the town held invalid);
Freeland v. Hastings (1865) 92 Mass. 570 (appropriation to refund money
paid for substitutes in Civil War held invalid); Lowell v. Boston (1873)
111 Mass. 454 (loans to individuals to rebuild following the disastrous
Boston fire held invalid).
19. (U. S.) 20 Wall. 655.
20. Id. at 664, cited and adopted in Jennings v. St. Louis (1933) 332
Mo. 173, 58 S. W. (2d) 979, 87 A. L. R. 365.
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In deciding whether a particular appropriation is for a public
purpose, the court will balance the immediate private and the
ultimate public gain; if the substantial inducement was the public
welfare, the tax or appropriation will be upheld.21
Concurrently with this judicial development, the legislatures
and people of many states were incorporating into their con-
stitutions provisions of various sorts aimed directly at the prac-
tice of aiding private enterprises with public funds. These pro-
visions took several forms: (1) limitation of all taxes to public
purposes ;22 (2) limitation on amount 23 and purpose 4 of state
and municipal indebtedness; and (3) prohibition of grants of
public money and property to individuals, corporations and asso-
ciations.2 5 The first type, as we have seen, is only declarative of
the judicially evolved rule. The second is the most common and
has been held to restrict only the state indebtedness, limiting in
no way expenditures of funds on hand.28 But all three are aimed
at the same evil and should be construed in the same light, that
is, a type of grant which one provision does not restrict should
not be restricted by the others.
The Constitution of Missouri 7 and those of many other states
contain co-ordinate provisions bearing on poor relief in the light
of which the grant of public funds restriction must be construed.
These provisions indicate that the grant of funds restrictions
were not meant to prohibit all relief of the poor. The Constitu-
tion of Missouri expressly authorizes the expenditure of state
funds for the support of the state eleemosynary institutions.
The question thereupon arising is, "Does the restriction prohibit
direct grants to individuals, i. e., outdoor relief, and allow relief
only through the eleemosynary institutions?" The distinction
between a grant of food or rent credits through a Social Security
Commission and a grant of food and lodging through a state
institution does not seem impressive, and it does not seem to
have been recognized by the courts. In State ex rel. Cryderman
v. Weinrich,28 where an appropriation to buy seed grain for
destitute farmers was upheld, the court said:
* * * we come to the means to be employed. Are they a
21. Opinion of the Justices (1937) 88 N. H. 484, 190 Atl. 425; and see
Patrick v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 350, 287 Pac. 455, 458.
22. Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 3.
23. Mo. Const. art. IV, sec. 44.
z4. Mo. Const. art. IV, sec. 45, 47.
25. Mo. Const. art. IV, sec. 46.
26. State ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson (1920) 170 Wis. 251, 176 N. W. 224.
27. Art. IV, sec. 43, par. 6.
28. (1918) 54 Mont 390, 170 Pac. 942.
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violation of section 1, art. 13 of the Constitution? Under
any and every measure of poor relief known to the law and
practice of this state, there is always a donation at least to
some individual; this is as obnoxious to the section just re-
ferred to as a loan of credit or a grant; and it matters not
that the donation is or may be food, fuel, or shelter, which
cost money, instead of the money itself. * * * They had and
were designed to have no reference whatever to suitable
measures, elsewhere commanded, for the relief of the poor.2
In Missouri the question arose in State ex rel. City of St. Louis
v. Seibert,30 where the issue was the validity of a grant to the
St. Louis insane asylum, not a state institution. Argument was
made that this was prohibited by the clause of the Constitution
of Missouri above referred to, but in a 4 to 3 decision the court
held that the ultimate grantees were the inmates, and disburse-
ment through a municipal corporation did not invalidate it. The
courts have thus construed these sections as restricting the use
to which the funds were to be put and not the method of dis-
bursement and have held them wholly inapplicable to poor relief,
at least when some other provision authorizes it.
In general it has been held that the restrictions do not apply
to disbursement statutes where: (1) the grant is to pay a moral
obligation of the state, (2) it is for a public purpose, or (3) it is
to carry out a governmental function. That a moral obligation is
sufficient to sustain a grant is almost universally accepted. Moral
obligations can be classified as benefits which are accepted and
enjoyed by the state without rendering an adequate considera-
tion3' or as injuries which have been suffered at the hands of a
government agent or in connection with the performance of a
governmental duty.32
There is a difference of opinion on the question of whether a
public purpose is sufficient to validate an appropriation. The
affirmative view33 is that the constitutional restrictions were a
29. 170 Pac. at 945.
30. (1893) 123 Mo. 424, 24 S. W. 750.
31. Soldiers' bonus acts have been sustained on the theory of moral debt.
State ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson (1919) 170 Wis. 218, 175 N. W. 589, 7 A. L.
R. 1617; Note (1920) 7 A. L. R. 1636, 1644. See also Mr. Justice Cardozo
dissenting in People v. The Westchester County Nat'l Bank (1921) 231 N.
Y. 465, 483, 132 N. E. 241, 15 A. L. R. 1344.
32. State ex rel. Crow v. St. Louis (1903) 174 Mo. 125, 73 S. W. 623,
61 L. R. A. 593; Board of Revenue and Road Comm'rs of Mobile County v.
Puckett (1933) 227 Ala. 374, 149 So. 850; Farrington v. State (1928) 248
N. Y. 112, 161 N. E. 438; Note (1924) 28 A. L. R. 1100.
33. Oakland v. Garrison (1924) 194 Cal. 298, 228 Pac. 433; Patrick v.
Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 350, 287 Pac. 455; in Hagler v. Small (1923) 307
Ill. 460, 138 N. E. 849, 855, it is said:
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development contemporaneous with the evolution of the public
purpose rule and were intended to achieve the same end. On this
ground an issuance of bonds by the city of San Francisco and a
grant of the proceeds for poor relief was upheld. 4 A constitu-
tional provision prohibiting the giving or lending of credit of
the state or any subdivision thereof in aid of an individual was
held to be inapplicable to the expenditure of money in pursuance
of a public purpose. Such a construction may be open to the
objection that the restriction was obviously directed at some
practices that have been held to be for public purposes. Grants
to railroads have been held to be for a public purpose almost
unanimously,- and yet they were the primary cause of the
adoption of these restrictions.3 6 Furthermore, many uses have
been declared public purposes when the public good has been so
remote as to leave no doubt that such appropriations, too, were
intended to be restricted.3 7 The restrictions were obviously aimed
at the same evil as the public purpose doctrine. But in many
instances, if not most, they were adopted independently and
were aimed more directly at a specific evil, rather than being
merely co-extensive with the judicially-evolved rule. It is sub-
mitted that these restrictions should be construed according to
Is the purpose of this act public or private only? If it be the latter,
it is within the prohibition of section 20 of article 4 of the Constitu-
tion; if the former, it is not. * * *
It is contended, however, that the question whether or not the pur-
pose is a public one is not the sole test as to whether this act provides
for a proper use of the credit of the state; that public money cannot
be paid to individuals through the use of the credit of the state, where
there is no moral or legal obligation of the state to that individual.
* * * It may be observed that it is incongruous to say that such a
public purpose may not be carried out to the benefit and welfare of the
state, unless it rests upon some legal or moral obligation to an individ-
ual. If the purpose be public, it is so because it makes for the public
weal. If such be the effect of it, the power to carry out such purpose
does not rest on obligation to the individual, but is found in the
general welfare provisions of the Constitution, and is based upon the
principle that the state is empowered to do that which it ought to do
for the public good. Such purpose is not primarily concerned with the
interest of the individual, but with the welfare of the public as a whole.
34. San Francisco v. Collins (1932) 216 Cal. 187, 13 P. (2d) 912.
35. See supra, note 17.
36. See supra, notes 8-11.
37. Thus soldiers' bonus acts have been sustained on the ground that they
promote patriotism and encourage the defense of the country in future
conflicts. Hagler v. Small (1923) 307 Ill. 460, 138 N. E. 849; State ex rel.
Atwood v. Johnson (1919) 170 Wis. 251, 176 N. W. 224. A grant to the
widow of a deceased circuit judge of the salary for the remaining portion
of his term of office has been declared valid because it induces good men to
enter public service. People ex rel. McDavid v. Barrett (1939) 370 Ill. 478,
19 N. E. (2d) 356, 121 A. L. M. 1311.
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the common meaning of their terms, always bearing in mind,
however, the evils they were intended to prevent. If the public
purpose test allows a type of appropriation which the provisions
were intended to prevent, that test cannot be the one which was
meant to be set up.
A New York court, passing upon a soldiers' bonus act, in
People v. Westchester Natl Bank,38 held a public purpose insuffi-
cient to take the expenditure out of the restriction. The court
reasoned that public purpose was the test before the provisions
were adopted and, therefore, that those provisions were meant to
further restrict spending.39
The third exception made to the restriction-spending for a
governmental duty or function-may be a more accurate test if
construed more narrowly than public purpose. The Constitution
of Pennsylvania prohibits all appropriations "for charitable,
educational, or benevolent purposes to any person or commu-
nity"40 but, in Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Liveright,41 an
appropriation of $10,000,000 for direct relief was held valid, the
court saying:
We again hold that the support of the poor-meaning
such persons as have been understood as coming within that
class ever since the organization of the government, persons
who are without means of support * * * is and always has
been a direct charge on the body politic for its own preserva-
tion and protection; and that as such, in the light of an
expense, stands exactly in the same position as the preserva-
tion of law and order. The expenditure of money by the
state for such purposes is in performance of a governmental
function or duty, and is not controlled by the constitutional
provision. 2
38. (1921) 231 N. Y. 465, 132 N. E. 241, 15 A. L. R. 1344. The same
result is reached in Hill v. Rae (1916) 52 Mont. 378, 158 Pac. 826, where a
farm loan act was held invalid. Such acts have been generally held to be
for a public purpose, Cobb v. Parnell (1931) 183 Ark. 429, 36 S. W. (2d)
388, but in the Hill case it was said, 158 Pac. at 831:
It will not suffice to say that, the general purposes of the act being
to foster agriculture, and thus to promote the public welfare, such
purpose is a public one; in the broad sense considered above it is so,
and so likewise are all the purposes mentioned in section 35 of article
5; yet money for them may not be appropriated unless the specific
objects are under the absolute control of the state.
39. That reasoning may not apply, however, in all jurisdictions. It is not
clear that it is fully accurate in New York, for the lending credit clause was
adopted in the constitution of 1846 (art. VII, sec. 9) before Sharpless v.
Mayor of Philadelphia and the grant of funds clause by an amendment to
that constitution in 1874 (art. VIII, sec. 10) before the public purpose test
was fully accepted by the courts.
40. Pa. Const. art. III, sec. 18.
41. (1932) 308 Pa. 35, 161 Atl. 697.
42. 161 Atl. at 710.
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In other words the court held that poor relief is not a "charita-
ble" or "benevolent" purpose but a public duty, a function that
must be exercised for the self-preservation of the government,
and consequently one of its necessary expenses. The two tests
of public purpose and governmental function may seem to be the
same. A public purpose implies that the act is done for the
general welfare of the state. Is it not a governmental function
to do anything not prohibited that will promote the general wel-
fare? The distinction would seem to be one between time hon-
ored functions of government, such as the preservation of law
and order, and temporary and individual measures, such as
granting a bonus to war veterans. Whether the constitutional
restriction was meant to apply to public purposes, it was cer-
tainly never intended to relieve the state of an obligation as-
sumed or of a function exercised for two and three-quarter
centuries.
The Missouri Court is committed to the public purpose test
although one or two cases do not seem to have followed it. 43 In
State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Seibert,44 in which a grant of
funds in aid of the insane was held valid as being for a public
purpose, the court said:
It may be stated as a generally accepted principle of law
that the legislature, with all its plenary powers, regardless
of constitutional restrictions and limitations, has no power
to raise money by taxation, or to appropriate it for purely
private purposes; but to insure against an attempt to do so
the constitution in express and positive terms deprives it of
such power by section 46.45
In the more recent case of State ex inf. McKittrick v. South-
western Bell Telephone Co.,46 a statute granting to the telephone
company the right to build telephone lines along, under, and over
state highways was challenged. Although the grant was without
43. By the vast majority of courts, pensions to policemen and firemen
have been held to be for a public purpose and valid under grant of funds
restrictions. State ex rel. Haberlan v. Love (1911) 89 Neb. 149, 131 N. W.
196; Commonwealth ex rel. Philadelphia Police Pension Fund Ass'n v.
Walton (1897) 182 Pa. 373, 38 Atl. 790, 61 Am. St. Rep. 712. In Missouri,
police pensions were held to violate those restrictions, but the court did not
indicate whether it considered such appropriations not to be for a public
purpose or the public purpose test insufficient. State ex rel. Heaven v.
Ziegenhein (1898) 144 Mo. 283, 45 S. W. 1099 (statute authorizing towns to
pension police); State ex rel. Wander v. Kimmel (1914) 256 Mo. 611, 165
S. W. 1067 (statute granting state funds to St. Louis Police Relief Ass'n,
which was, however, an organization to which not all policemen belonged).
44. (1894) 123 Mo. 424, 24 S. W. 750.
45. 24 S. W. at 750.
46. (1936) 338 Mo. 617, 92 S. W. (2d) 612.
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consideration the court upheld it, quoting and adopting the fol-
lowing passage from Georgia v. Cincinnati Southern R. R. :47
A conveyance in aid of a public purpose from which great
benefits are expected is not within the class of evils the Con-
stitution intended to prevent and in our opinion is not within
the meaning of the word as it naturally should be under-
stood.48
Missouri is also committed to the view that poor relief is a
public purpose, and behind this proposition the weight of author-
ity throughout all jurisdictions is overwhelming. 41 Thus, a city
ordinance providing for the issuance of bonds to provide for
poor relief has been upheld as for a public purpose."
If the public purpose test should be deemed too all-inclusive
and only those grants which are in performance of a govern-
mental function be upheld, poor relief must certainly be held a
governmental function. The view of Commonwealth ex rel.
Schnader v. Liveright51 is that poor relief is a necessary expense
of government and a duty that must be fulfilled for the self-
preservation of the government. The Kentucky court said of it:
That the care of the indigent poor is a purely public
charity is not really questioned by the Attorney General.
Christ commended it as a public privilege, whilst every
civilized people upon the earth now regard it as a public
duty. That great evasive question propounded in the adjust-
ment of the first social relation of men, "Am I my brother's
keeper?" is answered emphatically in the affirmative upon
the consciences of this era of civilization, when speaking of
the destitute and helpless. In this state, from its earliest
history, it has been treated, as it had been in Virginia and
England before us, as a public charge imposed as a matter
47. (1918) 248 U. S. 26.
48. State ex inf. McKittrick v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. (1936)
338 Mo. 617, 92 S. W. (2d) 612, 614.
49. Woman's Relief Corps Home Ass'n v. Nye (1908) 8 Cal. App. 527,
97 Pac. 208, 211; San Francisco v. Collins (1932) 216 Cal. 187, 13 P. (2d)
912; Hager v. Kentucky Children's Home Society (1904) 119 Ky. 235, 83
S. W. 605, 67 L. R. A. 815; Cooley, Taxation (2d ed. 1886) 124.
50. Jennings v. St. Louis (1933) 332 Mo. 173, 58 S. W. (2d) 979, 87
A. L. R. 365.
51. (1932) 308 Pa. 35, 161 Atl. 697, 710. In a concurring opinion, 161
Atl. at 715, it is said:
The greatest menace to the well-being and safety of the state is for
it to have hundreds of thousands of its able-bodied and willing citizens
suffering with their families, from hunger and lack of clothing and
shelter because work is unattainable. An appropriation from a public
treasury to relieve this suffering is no more a "charitable" appropria-
tion than an appropriation made to suppress an uprising, repel an
invasion, or to combat a pestilence.
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of rightful exercise of governmental power upon the state,
or such subdivisions of it as legislation might provide.
52
Suffice it to say that no modern, civilized government has ever
failed to recognize an obligation to support the poor and in-
digent.
The Missouri constitutional provision differs from the public
funds section of most other states in only one material aspect,
viz., the addition of the proviso: "That this shall not be so con-
strued as to prevent the grant of aid in case of public calamity."
What is the significance of this addition? What does it indicate
as to the intention of its framers as to the scope of the section?
The entire section with the proviso was first adopted in the
Constitution of 1875. In 1873 the landmark case of Lowell v.
Boston53 was decided in Massachusetts. It held that loans to
those whose property and homes had been destroyed by the
great fire which swept Boston in 1872 were not for a public
purpose and hence were invalid. Generally grants and loans to
aid individuals following a public calamity have been held in-
valid by the courts.54 It is submitted that the Missouri proviso
was added to avoid a construction based on the reasoning in
Lowell v. Boston and the line of cases subsequently built upon it.
The presence of the proviso, then, is entirely consistent with the
view that the section sets up a public purpose test.
It may be contended, and indeed it is believed by many, that
in the present industrial depression poor relief could be sustained
under the "public calamity" proviso. That question would turn
on whether the meaning of "public calamity" as used in the Con-
stitution of Missouri properly includes widespread suffering
caused by unemployment or only that caused by purely natural
phenomena such as flood or fire. There is little authority to in-
dicate the answer, for such a proviso appears in the public funds
restriction of only the state of Texas,55 and there are no adjudi-
cated cases in which the courts have been called upon to construe
it. Webster's Dictionary 6 defines calamity as any great mis-
fortune or cause of loss or misery. Under this, the term would
seem to include an industrial depression. The point would seem
52. Hager v. Children's Home Society (1904) 119 Ky. 235, 83 S. W. 605,
606, 67 L. R. A. 815. Accord: San Francisco v. Collins (1932) 216 Cal. 187,
13 P. (2d) 912.
53. 111 Mass. 454, 15 Am. Rep. 39.
54. Patty v. Colgan (1893) 97 Cal. 251, 31 Pac. 1133, 18 L. R. A. 744
(Tia Juana flood); Feldman & Co. v. Charleston (1884) 23 S. C. 57, 55
Am. Rep. 6 (Charleston fire).
55. Tex. Const. art. III, sec. 51.
56. Webster's New International Dictionary (Merriam Co. ed. 1925).
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debatable, but it is not within the scope of this paper to discuss
the many factors which bear upon it. It may be said, however,
that even should the grant of funds restriction be held applicable
to poor relief, it could be strongly contended that it should be
sustained in the present situation under the proviso.
Thus when article IV, section 46 of the Constitution of Mis-
souri is considered in the light of its history and purpose, and
when the tests used to ascertain the scope of such sections are
applied, that section is found not to have been intended to pro-
hibit direct poor relief. An appropriation for poor relief would
be constitutional regardless of the existence of a public calamity;
but if an economic depression and widespread unemployment be
found to be a public calamity, poor relief can be brought within
the proviso and sustained on that ground.
WAYNE B. WRIGHT.
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